Deference, Tolerance, and Numbers: A
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The United States Sentencing Commission promulgates the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which greatly constrain judicial discretion in choosing the sentence for federal crimes. One
commentator has argued that the willingness of the courts and
Congress to defer to a guideline should depend on whether the
Commission has justified the guideline by reference to empirical
evidence. This article explores the theoretical and practical difficulties of giving such effect to empiricaljustifications.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have radically changed the
practice of criminal sentencing in federal courts. Like sentencers in
most jurisdictions, federal judges formerly possessed considerable
discretion to fix an offender's sentence within the broad range typically existing between the statutorily set maximum and minimum
sentences for the offense. The Sentencing Reform Act of 19841 established the United States Sentencing Commission, which was
charged with developing guidelines that would narrow this enormous
power.' The resulting guidelines, which require the court to make
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findings on facts that are not themselves elements of the statutory
offense (for example, the scope of a defendant's criminal record or
whether a firearm was used in an offense), narrow the range within
which the court is expected to sentence in the ordinary case.
How should these guidelines be treated by the President, who
evaluates new guidelines; by Congress, which approves any new
guidelines; and by the courts, which apply the guidelines and determine whether particular guidelines are within the power of the Commission to promulgate? In a thoughtful article, 3 Professor Ronald
Wright argues that two attributes of the United States Sentencing
Commission inform how the guidelines should be treated. First, the
Commission is well positioned to assess how judges have approached
sentencing issues and how they continue to approach them. This advantage is absent to the extent that the Commission "strays too far
from judicial sentencing practice."' 4 (But it is present, for example,
when the Commission justifies a guideline as reflecting the usual preguideline punishment for a crime.) Second - and this is one reason
the Commission possesses the first advantage - the Commission has
the ability to collect and evaluate empirical data relevant to sentencing policy. 5
Wright is quite explicit about how these domains of special competence should affect Congress: a proposed rule for which the Commission does not provide "adequate support . . . , based in empirical
evidence or the experience of sentencing courts," should result in
Congress's "invalidating the proposed amendment and asking the
Commission to try again."' Conversely, Congress should not interfere with a guideline that is justified on such grounds.7 Wright is
somewhat more coy about the role of the courts. Though he generally advocates judicial reluctance to strike a guideline, he is less
clear about how severely a judge should feel bound in sentencing a
defendant under a guideline that is justified by neither judicial practice nor empirical evidence. The guidelines permit a judge to "depart" from the guideline sentencing range when the judge concludes
the case involves facts not adequately considered by the Commission
in promulgating the guidelines. Though Wright does not explicitly so
state, his argument seemingly suggests that courts should be free to
depart from a sentence when a guideline is not justified by either
3.
spective
4.
5.
6.
Wright,

Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law Peron the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1991).
Id. at 34.
See id. at 11-16.
Wright puts the point this way in a summary of his article. See Ronald F.
The United States Sentencing Commission As an Administrative Agency, 4
FED. SENTENCING REP. 136 (1991).
7. Wright, supra note 3, at 76.
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judicial practice or empirical evidence. He certainly offers no argument that would support the anomolous position of asking courts to
defer to rules that he would like Congress to invalidate.
Though Wright's article has much to commend it - and though I
concur with many of Wright's recommendations - I have considerable difficulty with Wright's preference for empirically justified rules
other than those justified by reference to past judicial practice. For
simplicity's sake, I shall refer to such justifications simply as empirical justifications, excluding the empirical justification of past judicial
practice except when mentioned explicitly. Wright's preference for
empirically justified rules strikes me as theoretically problematic and
likely to generate bad consequences.
Before we can assess Wright's approach, we should examine
whether he accepts it himself. Consider Wright's treatment of the
death penalty. Though Wright is quite clear in articulating the reasons for deferring to the Commission, his treatment of the death
penalty is inconsistent with his own model and carries the seeds of
broader deference to the Commission that Wright explicitly favors.
While arguing that Congress should normally "allow the Commission to initiate and guide the development of sentencing legislation," '
Wright seeks to exclude capital punishment from that directive.
Though Wright suggests that the "moral outrage of the public over a
particular crime may be considered an acceptable basis for imposing
the death penalty," he asserts that "responding to such outrage does
not call on the empirical research capabilities of the Commission,"
and he notes that federal courts have no substantial experience in
deciding how to apply the death penalty (as opposed to reviewing the
constitutional limits on when a state may impose the ultimate
sanction) .9

Albeit questionable, 0 this argument is at least consistent with

8. Id. at 79.
9. Id. at 79-80.
10. If one assumes that public outrage over certain types of offenses is a justifiable
basis for imposing the death penalty, then the Commission's ability to conduct empirical
research does give it a privileged position from which to address the issue, for the question of what kind of crime generates such public opinion is an empirical one capable of
evaluation through standard polling techniques not beyond the Commission's abilities.
Elsewhere in his article, Wright himself seems to accept this point, identifying "information about the harms caused by crimes, or public perceptions of the seriousness of various
crimes," id. at I1 n.33, as examples of the portion of sentencing policy that has a "sizeable empirical component, susceptible of improvement or verification through research."
Id. at 10- 11. I tend to agree with Wright's bottom line here, however, for I am personally
skeptical about how large a role public outrage ought to play in justifying the death
penalty.

Wright's articulated approach to the Commission's expertise. He
goes on, however, to add another reason that the Commission is not
entitled to occupy a privileged position with respect to the death penalty: the absence of any "packaging" problem with Congressional
initiatives respecting the death penalty. Wright notes that when
Congress increases the offense level for one offense, it creates a packaging problem because other offenses must be changed to continue
' Such problems do not arise if Con"treat[ing] like offenses alike."11
gress legislates about the death penalty, Wright argues, because
"death is

. .

. different." 12 I grant that death is qualitatively differ-

ent from, say, a twenty-five year sentence. But can anyone seriously
doubt that death is more severe? If a statute increasing the penalty
for crime A to twenty-five years necessitates an increase in the penalty for crime B, can anyone seriously argue that a statute increasing
the penalty for crime A to death does not necessitate any increase in
the penalty for crime B? The packaging problem seems not to have
disappeared.
While I am thus unconvinced by Wright's argument regarding the
death penalty, the more ominous threat to his thesis is that his death
penalty argument will be taken seriously. Assume, as Wright argues,
that no packaging problem exists regarding the death penalty, and
that the absence of packaging problems is a real reason for Congress
not to defer to the Commission on death penalty issues. If the absence of packaging problems justifies no deference regarding the
death penalty, then must not the presence of packaging problems
constitute yet a third basis (in addition to tracking judicial practice
and reliance on empirical research) for deferring to the Commission
in all other areas? Either the presence of packaging problems is a
reason for deference or it is not; the factor cannot justify nondeference in the death penalty area, yet suddenly become irrelevant
outside that area.13 In other words, Wright has identified no reason
(and I have thought of none) which would justify paying attention to
the packaging problem in the death penalty context, but not in other
settings.
The problem thus posed for Wright's articulatedgeneral approach
to deference is substantial, because in almost any area a change in
11. Id. at 80.
12. Id. at 80 n.362 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305
(1976) (plurality opinion)).
13. I should emphasize that this is a problem for Wright even if he is correct in
arguing that death is different. My objection to that argument assumes that Wright is
correct in arguing that packaging is relevant to the question of deference, but rejects the
conclusion that death is different in a way that eliminates packaging problems. My argument here is that Wright's position that packaging is relevant to the question of deference, if taken as true, should not be viewed as inherently limited to the death penalty
context.
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one guideline will raise substantial "packaging" problems rendering
irrelevant any consideration of whether the Commission has tracked
judicial performance or based its decision on empirical information.
Consider the frequency with which packaging problems will occur.
Suppose the Commission believes two offenses to be of equal severity. If Congress increases the offense level for one of them, then the
Commission will feel the need to increase the offense level for the
other offense as well. Moreover, a similar analysis also should dictate
changed penalties for still other offenses, whose severity the Commission assesses as some ratio of the severity of the offense whose
sentence Congress has altered.1 4 And there is no reason that this process should be limited to offenses that somehow deal with "related"
subject matters. Though it may not be as apparent, a change in a
drug statute presents a packaging problem not only respecting other
drug offenses, but regarding all other offenses. Taking packaging
problems seriously would greatly expand the deference due the Commission. It may be beneficial to view the packaging argument as just
a failed attempt to explain why deference to the Commission is not
justified regarding the death penalty, a position that may well be
justifiable on other grounds. 15
But let us take Wright at his word. What of his model's preference for empirically justified rules? Assessing his model's coherence
requires answering another question: What exactly should count as
adequate empirical support for a rule? Whatever it is, it apparently
is lacking from the Commission's explanation of its policy statement
prohibiting departures based on age.' 6 Accordingly, were the Commission to promulgate the policy statement on age as a guideline,
Wright would advocate that Congress not permit the guideline to go
into effect. But what would Wright say if the hypothetical guideline
were justified as follows?

14.

For example, if the Commission regards crime A as half as serious as crime B,

and Congress increases the penalty for crime B, then the Commission would still feel the

need to increase the penalty for crime A to retain the proper distinction between the two
offenses. Cf. Wright, supra note 3, at 78 ("a change in one statute creates pressure for
the Commission to change its guidelines in related areas for the sake of consistency, thus

creating a ripple of changes in large areas of the guidelines").
15.

See, e.g., supra note 10 (challenging Wright's suggestion that deference to

public opinion may be warranted).
16. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 2, §§ 5H.1-6. This is among the guidelines
that Wright criticizes as having been promulgated by the Commission with "no support-

ing explanation at all." Wright, supra note 3, at 66.

Age, including youth, is not ordinarily relevant. Reducing sentences for

those who are young decreases the demand on scarce prison resources. [Im-

agine here a discussion of how many offenders are young and how much the
reduction of their sentences would reduce demands on the system.] Not-

withstanding this effect, the Commission's projections show that a failure to

consider youth in sentencing will not result in demands that exceed available resources. [Imagine here a discussion of the Commission's projections.]

We now have a proposed rule that is, in some sense, empirically
justified. If Wright merely argued that Congress should defer to the
Commission's empirical judgments, I would have little objection. On
such an approach, my proposed rule would not be immune to Congressional review. Instead, in reviewing the rule, Congress would
simply be told that it should defer to the Commission's assessment of
the likely effects of the rule. Thus, while Congress could block the
rule, it should not block the rule on the ground that consideration of
youth is necessary to reduce demand on prison resources. Congress
would be free, however, to act based on other concerns: Congress'
belief that lower sentences for the young will not significantly increase crimes by the young, or its belief that those who commit
crimes at a young age often are less culpable than older criminals
because the young have not had sufficient opportunities to learn the
right path. The reason for deference to the Commission would be
clear; the Commission should be deferred to regarding those of its
judgments that it is especially well-suited to make. Because the
Commission is better suited than Congress or the courts to collect
and evaluate empirical data, it should be deferred to respecting the
impact of its proposed rule on prison populations. We might think of
this level of deference as "narrow deference," and we would likely
think it clearly justifiable on the grounds of Commission expertise.
But Wright's approach is somewhat different. He does not simply
require deference to the Commission's empirical assessments; he requires deference to the Commission's empiricallyjustified rules, and
he advocates that the Commission not be allowed to promulgate
rules that lack empirical, including judicial practice, justification. 17
We can call Wright's approach a "broad deference" approach. This
broad deference approach requires an analytic step not necessary in
the narrow deference approach. Under the broad deference approach, we must decide exactly how much empirical justification for
a rule is needed before Congress permits it to take effect. Would
Wright actually find the "justification" for my age guideline sufficient to deserve Congressional deference to the rule?
I suspect that many would find anomolous a requirement that
Congress reject an utterly unsupported age guideline but defer to my
17. See Wright, supra note 3, at 79-80. Wright believes that capital punishment or
special sanctions for corporate defendants are two areas where the Commission lacks
guidance from empirical evidence.
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modified age guideline. The reason is that deference to my proposed
guideline so radically exceeds the level of deference that a focus on
expertise would justify. We reject the completely unsupported rule
because it implies several conclusions that the Commission has no
special expertise in embracing (at least in the absence of empirical
evidence). Among the possible conclusions are (1) that youth need
not be considered to preserve scarce prison resources, (2) that lower
sentences for the young will lead to increased crimes by the young,
and (3) that those who commit crimes at a young age are no less
culpable than older criminals. But if Congress cannot block the same
rule because of a justification of the kind I have offered, then Congress is being required to defer to the Commission on judgments (2)
and (3) notwithstanding the Commission's lack of special expertise
respecting those judgments. 18
Now consider how we should treat our age guideline if the Commission offered a fuller justification for it. In addition to the argument about prison resources, suppose the Commission also justified
its rule by reference to studies suggesting that any significant reduction in punishment for youthful crime would likely lead to some particular increase in the crime-rate among the young. We may now
feel more comfortable about deferring to the Commission's rule. But
should we? Evidence about the effects of sentencing on criminal behavior is only part of the relevant inquiry even for a simple consequentialist - that is, for a person who believes that punishment
should occur if but only if it will be socially beneficial. A consequentialist would want to know not just (1) the effect on crime of the
proposed rule, but also (2) the cost of imposing the punishment and
(3) the social harm when the crime occurs. It is a staple of consequentialist punishment theory that, on certain facts, more crime will
be better than less crime.'" If Wright would require Congress to defer to this better-justified age guideline, he would require Congress
18. I should make clear that I do not necessarily agree that the Commission lacks
expertise in making these judgments, or at least would continue to lack expertise in making them if permitted to do so. My argument is that, from an expertise perspective,
Wright's clear advice that Congress block rules justified by neither empirical evidence
nor judicial practice implies that the Commission lacks special expertise on these issues
in the case of a totally unjustified rule. The Commission gains no expertise on these
issues by doing empirical research on other issues.
19. For example, if we could reduce the number of robberies by one per year by
increasing punishment tenfold, a consequentialist almost inevitably would conclude that
the cost of increasing punishment tenfold is not justified by the avoidance of one robbery,
and thus that more crime is better than less crime. I have explored consequentialist punishment theory in Kevin Cole, Killings During Crime: Toward a DiscriminatingTheory
657

to defer to the Commission's judgment on points (2) and (3), even
though an expertise explanation of why empirical evidence is important would lead to the conclusion that, in the absence of empirical
evidence, the Commission has no special expertise to decide those
issues.
Of course, the Commission could go farther. It could expand its
empirical inquiry to include the cost of imposing the punishment and
the social harm when the crime occurs - to undertake what Wright
calls "cost-benefit analysis. ' 0 If this is the level of empirical evidence that Wright would require before Congress should defer to the
Commission, it would be tempting to conclude that Wright is advocating a system justified by an expertise rationale (and indeed, that
his "broad deference" approach does not significantly depart from a
"narrow deference" approach), for the Commission will have gathered and evaluated empirical evidence on each of the issues a consequentialist should consider to determine what penalty to impose for a
crime.
Although this conclusion is tempting, it would be wrong, for the
Commission would not have gathered and evaluated any empirical
evidence relevant to the decision of whether one should in fact be a
consequentialist, wrong indeed because empirical evidence cannot
speak to that point at all. No one can devise the multiple-regression
study that will prove it is morally objectionable knowingly to punish
an innocent person or knowingly to punish a person in excess of the
punishment the person deserves, even if that punishment would produce a net gain in social happiness. My objections to such punishments are nonconsequentialist; they are derived from moral
principle, not from predictions about what effects punishment would
have on society. But the fact that such objections are nonconsequentialist does not make them inconsequential. In fact, I suspect that
the great majority of contemporary criminal law theorists embrace
some similar nonconsequentialist view about the appropriate limits of
punishment.
The inability of empirical evidence to identify which fundamental
value choices to make in framing sentencing policy demonstrates
that a requirement of Congressional deference, even to a rule supported by cost-benefit analysis, is ultimately unjustifiable by notions
of the Commission's expertise flowing from its special ability to collect and evaluate empirical data. But my concern is not simply to
demonstrate that expertise in evaluating empirical evidence cannot
alone justify any version of "broad deference." In addition, differential treatment for empirically justified and nonempirically justified
of Strict Liability, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 73 (1991).
20. Wright, supra note 3, at 83.
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rules risks skewing sentencing policy toward the punishment theories
that lend themselves most readily to empirical support.
Empirical support will come much more readily for rules justified
by certain punishment theories. The familiar consequentialist justifications for punishment - deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation - all turn on the effects of punishment. As such, the rules they
generate are all supportable by empirical evidence, though as Wright
correctly2 1 notes, the empirical questions often will be difficult to
answer.
In contrast, nonconsequentialist punishment theories - for example, a retributive focus that opposes punishments in excess of just
deserts - will not necessarily be sharpened by wide-ranging empirical inquiries. Wright asserts that the "empirical element is present
regardless of the theory of sentencing purposes at work."22 The only
remotely nonconsequentialist theory he explores, however, is addressed in the following sentence: "A theory aimed at making punishment proportional to the seriousness of an offense might benefit
from information about the harms caused by crimes, or public perceptions of the seriousness of various crimes." 2 I take this to be
Wright's effort to show how empirical evidence is relevant to a retributivist. However, Wright is exploring but a narrow and, to my
mind, morally problematic strand of retributive theory. The information he identifies would be useful to a harm-based retributivist, one
who believes that the morally justifiable punishment for a crime
turns on the harm the criminal caused. But the information would be
of precious little use to an intent-based retributivist, one who believes
the morally justifiable punishment for a crime turns not on the harm
the criminal caused, but rather on the harm that the criminaf intended to cause. A harm-based retributivist would want to know the
indirect harms caused and the public unrest created by particular
crimes to assess accurately the harm that a particular defendant has
caused and the sentence the defendant deserves. For an intent-based
retributivist, however, harms so indirect or inperceptible as to reveal
themselves only through social science methodology likely will have
escaped the criminal's attention as well. If they have not, evidence
about the criminal himself and his situation will be the far preferable means by which to learn that the criminal in fact adverted to
those harms.
21. See id. at 86.
22. Id. at 11 n.33.
23. Id.

I do not mean to suggest that no case can be made in favor of
harm-based retributivist or consequentialist punishment theories;
however, I do mean to claim that we should be leery of providing the
Commission with incentives to slide toward such theories without
any requirement of justification beyond the obligation to crunch
some numbers. Wright's differential approach to deference, with its
preference for empiricism, is thus not without risk. The risk increases the greater the empiricial evidence required to trigger broad
deference. Cost-benefit analysis, for example, simply does not speak
to an intent-based retributive theory. The risk is less when less empirical evidence is required to trigger broad deference. After all, even
an intent-based retributivist can study what demands a proposed rule
will make on prison resources. But the lower the level of empirical
evidence needed to trigger broad deference, the greater the gulf becomes between the requirement of deference and the justification
that the Commission has special expertise in assessing empirical evidence. And even if the objection to expertise is overlooked, a slight
requirement of empirical justification still poses some risk of skewing
Commission rules toward particular punishment theories. As more
kinds of empirical justifications will be available for some punishment theories than for others, some will remain easier to justify than
will others.
The problems I discuss here could be remedied in either of the two
following ways. We could defer to Commission rules even when their
justifications are not empirically based, or we could decline to defer
to Commission rules when they are justified by empiricism alone. By
treating empirically justified rules with the same level of deference
as nonempirically justified rules, either approach eliminates the
troublesome incentives in Wright's approach.
Deferring to both empirically and nonempirically justified rules
would vest considerable power in the Commission. The extent of
power turns in part on whether courts in the departure setting are
expected to defer to the same rules to which Congress defers. If
courts may not depart from a guidelines sentence when the Commission has rationally explained its rule (by reference to empiricism or
otherwise), then the Commission will have been given considerable
power to make the value choices inherent in any decision to prefer a
consequentialist theory to a nonconsequentialist one, or vice versa.
Those who disagree with the Commission's value decisions will be
consigned to seek their remedy from Congress directly, which is
likely a difficult task. This greater power would surely increase pressures to politicize the Commission.
On the other hand, if courts are permitted to depart even where
Congress should defer - so long as, for example, the Commission's
rule is not justified in terms of judicial practice - the consequences
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of permitting the Commission to promulgate rules justified in other
terms are less sweeping. The Commission's initial value choice could
be viewed as a simple mechanism to focus judicial attention on an
area of sentencing difficulty. So long as courts are clear on their
power to depart, the period after the Commission's promulgation of
a rule would constitute a sort of judicial referendum on the Commission's value choice. Courts that agree with the Commission's choice,
and courts that disagree with the Commission's choice but agree
with the Commission's sentence for different reasons on the facts of
the case before them,24 will apply the Commission's rule when the
time comes. Other courts will depart. Through this process, the
Commission will be able to discern not only how many judges prefer
one sentencing policy over another, but also which cases are the ones
in which judges believe the choice of theory should make a difference. Ultimately, the Commission will be able to justify its rule by
reference to judicial acceptance, or it will have sufficient evidence to
devise a new rule in accord with judicial practice. On this approach,
the Commission may serve as an agenda-setter on sentencing policy 25
and even an advocate for a particular position, but the fundamental
value choices that underlie sentencing policy would continue to be
made by sentencing judges. Some will regard such an arrangement
as putting the decision where the expertise lies. Even those who disagree that judges have expertise on these issues that commissioners
lack may nevertheless feel that the greater number of sentencing
judges increases the chance that their views will fairly present the
alternatives available, and that the number of federal judges and the
assorted other issues they confront will make the judiciary more resistant to political pressure directed toward particular sentencing
outcomes.
The other way of removing Wright's preference for empiricism
deferring to Commission rules only when they are justified by judicial practice - seems to abandon too many of the potential advantages of the Commission approach. Confining the Commission to
24. It will often be true that the same sentence will be justifiable in a case on both
consequentialist and deontological grounds. For example, the retributive notion that punishment in the absence of fault is unjust might also be defended in deterrent terms. Our
highest deterrent yield results from spending our punishment dollars on those who cause
harm through fault, for those contemplating causing harm are the persons most susceptible to influence through the threat of punishment.
25. The courts would not completely surrender their power to set the agenda, however. Even without an explicit Commission rule to spur debate, a court might act ag
something of an agenda-setter simply through the act of departure.

rules reflecting judicial practice would vest more sentencing power in
courts than under a system of deference to all manner of justifications. First, it would deprive the Commission of the ability to set the
judiciary's sentencing agenda, for a rule that could not be justified
by reference to existing sentencing patterns would be nullified by
Congress. Second, it would eliminate the risk that judicial inertia
would permit a Commission's value choices to become law without
sufficient scrutiny. But the ability of an agency devoted to the study
of sentencing issues to identify issues needing attention by the courts
strikes me as a strength of the Commission approach. And if courts
are unwilling to accept the Commission's invitation to study vexing
sentencing problems -

if inertia is indeed a risk -

then I suspect

empowering the Commission is the only means likely to result in improvements in sentencing.
I do not take the courts' reluctance thus far to depart from the
guidelines as strong evidence that the courts are unwilling to play a
role in creating sentencing policy. I suspect, instead, that courts simply need to heed one of Wright's most important messages - in the
war on sentencing disparity, departures are not acts of cowardice.2 a
I wish to emphasize one additional point. The option of deferring
even to nonempirically justified rules does not dictate deferring to
rules for which the Commission offers no justification at all. I agree
with Wright that the Commission owes us something more than ipse
dixit when it promulgates a rule that does not purport to rest on past
judicial practice.2 7 I find attractive Wright's conclusion that the statutory right of courts to depart in cases in which the Commission has
not adequately considered a relevant factor supports requiring the
Commission to offer some explanation for its guidelines, much as the
Administrative Procedure Act precludes "arbitrary" and "capricious" actions by the agencies to which it applies - a requirement
that courts have read as requiring agencies to provide reasons for
their actions.
I simply think we should remain open to guidelines supported by
nonempirical justifications. These justifications will take different
forms from the justifications available to consequentialist theorists.
A retributivist who cites "some good end" that derives from punishment is subject to the criticism that he is actually just a consequentialist. 28 At the very least, however, we can expect the retributivist to
identify his premises (e.g., with respect to the hypothesized age
guideline, that youth is really not relevant to an actor's culpability,
26. See Wright, supra note 3, at 67-69.
27. Id. at 69.
28. Hugo A. Bedau, Retribution and the Theory of Punishment, 75 J. PHIL. 601
(1978).
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or that guideline penalties already have been set with the young offender in mind, simply giving a punishment break to older offenders,
or [to argue the other way] that youth, in fact, is a substantial factor
in assessing culpability) and to suggest why those premises are consistent with positions taken in other guidelines. Such explanations
would facilitate reasoned debate of the guidelines.

